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Case No. 7960

IN THE SUPREME COURT
l

of. the

STATE OF UTAH
_A_LLEN BECK,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RI-IODES JEPPESEN, d. b. a.
JEPPESEN POTATO CHIP COMAXY, and OZIAS HARVEY HAR'VARD,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a collision between a 1947 Dodge
Coupe owned and driven by the plaintiff and a small
1946 Dodge delivery truck with a van type body, owned
by defendant, Rhodes Jeppesen and used in his potato
chip business and which truck was being driven by
defendant, Ozias Harvey Harward, at the time of the
collision. The collision occurred on the 23rd day of
May, 1952 at about the hour of 6:00 P.M. or in the early
evening while it was still daylight. (R. 8, 10). The
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scene of the collision "Tas at an intersection of t"To
alleys \V hich "~ere located in the middle of the block
occupied by and in the rear of the Para1nount Theater,
l(eeleys Ice Cream Store, the Naylor Automobile
Company and the Provo City Bakery. This block is
located in the center of the business distriet in Provo
City, Utah. The \Vest to east alley started at the rear
of certain uniden ti:fied buildings on the \Yest side of
the block (see plaintiff's exhibit "C" looking to tile
\vest past the rear of the Paran1ount Theater), and
\vent eastward past the rear of the Pararnount Theater
on the south crossing then the south to north alley and
proceeding along the south side of the Provo City
Bakery, then proceeding to First East Street on the
east side of the block (see plaintiff's exhibit "A"
looking to the east, showing the bakery on the left, and
First East Street in the background). The south to
north alley started in the rear of Keeleys Ice Crean1
Store, proceeded on the east side of the Para1nount
Theater, crossed the \vest to east alley, passed the rear
of the Provo City Bakery on the east then past the
Naylor Automobile Company on the west and proceeded out onto University street on the north. (plaintiff's exhibit "B" showing rear of Bakery on right
and Naylor Automobile Company on the left and exit to
University street. (R. 16, 17). The plaintiff drove
his automobile from the west toward the east (R. 18)
along the rear of the Paramount Theater which would
be on his right side (R. 10).
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As he drove along from the 'vest he traveled about
three feet aw·ay fron1 the north side of the Paramount
building. (R. 18-19). The plaintiff had been parked
and had traveled about 60 to 75 feet before he came
to the east corner of the Paramount Building (R. 18.)
The defendants had parked in the rear of Keeleys
Store, had made a delivery and were driving to the
north along the east side of the Paramount theater at
about 3 to 8 feet away from the Paramount Building.
(R. 34, 49.) The defendants had traveled from where
they were parked about the .length of a car (R. 49).
l(eeleys Store 'vas about 60 feet back from the intersection (R. 20). These alleys are about 12 feet wide.
(R. 49) The intersection measures obliquely from the
southwest corner to the northeast corner about 18 feet
(R. 21). The collision occurred when the automobiles
of the plaintiff and the defendant Jeppesen, came upon
each other around the corner of the Paramount theater
building which is about '60 feet high (R. 12). Opposite
the Paramount Theater building to the north is an open
space in back of the Naylor Automobile Company. (see
plaintiff's exhibit "B" and ''C".) ,Opposite the Paramount theater building to the east is also an open parking lot. (R. 11).
In the plaintiff's own words and by his own witnesses the plaintiff was leaving this enclosed area by
way of the west to east alley and was going east past
the Paramount building approaching the intersection
above referred to. He claims he was going about ten
miles per hour (R. 20) and had half of his automobile
~-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
out past the coi·ner of the Pararnount building (R. :21)
\\Then he savv the defendant's truck for the first ti1ne. It
\Vas then about 25 feet do\vn the other alley to the
south. (R. 12, 19, 20). Plaintiff then slan1n1ed on his
brakes and claims the defendants' truck hit his antoInobile on the right side just back of the right front
fender causing plaintiff to go to the left and into a
telephone pole on the south\vest corner of the ProvrJ
Bakery. (see plaintiff's exhibit "£\"). (R. 12). Plaintiff did not kno\Y the defendants' speed (R. 20, 22).
The plain tiff claims his dan1age \vas to his car just
back of the right front fender, right door and right
rear fender and then after hitting the telephone pole
the left front of the autornobile '' as further da1naged.
(R. 13, 27) including the left front tire, the grill, headlight and bumper. The length of the plaintiff's car
\vas about 15 feet (R. 21, 35). After the ilnpact the left
front end of the plaintiff's car was resting against
the telephone pole and the nose of the defendants' truck
\Vas about even with the north or rear end of the Paramount building. (R. 35, 36, 47). There is a dispute,
however, as to whether the defendant's truck had been
1noved after the impact.
The defendants' version of the accident as revealed
by the evidence of both defendants vvas to the effect
that both defendants, Mr. Jeppesen as the owner of the
,Jeppesen Potato Chip Company, and Mr. llarward, as
driver of the Jeppesen truck, had gone to the rear
of Keeleys Ice Cream Store to deliver potato chip~.
The defendants truck had been parked facing north in
the parking area to the east of the Paran1ount build7
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ing, uext to the allPy. That after rnaking the delivery
the driYcr Lacked up slightly to the south enough to
clear a post and then proceeded to drive north in the
south to north alley along the. east side of the ParaInount building to\Yarcl the intersection in question.
(R. 48, 49, 56, 37). The truck was traveling out from
the Paramount building about 8 feet, (R. 49). The
truck still in len\,. gea1, had covered at about 3 to 5 miles
per hour (R. 51, 3-±) about its own length from where
it "\Yas parked "~hen the nose of the defendants' truck
got about 2 feet beyond the north edge of the Paramount building, when the defendant driver, noticed the
plaintiff's automobile approaching from the west (R.
49, 59). The defendant driver stopped immediately
just as the plaintiff went past scrubbing the entire
length of the plaintiff's car on its right side from the
front fender back. The pliantiff's automobile then went
on at an angle and hit head on into the telephone pole.
(R. 49, 50). The defendants maintain the defendants'
truck remained in that position throughout the investigation and was not moved (R. 50). The defendants
estimate that plaintiff's speed at a "pretty good speed"
or around 25 miles per hour (R. 51). From the point
of impact to the pole hit by the plaintiff is about 15
to 16 feet. (R. 53). Defendant Jeppesen also remembered
traveling just the length of the truck, barely getting started before arriving at the corner. He roughly puts
the plaintiff's automobile about 30 to 40 feet away.
(R. 57) just as the truck stopped and that the plaintiff going at 30 to 40 miles per hour collided with the
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front end of the defendants' truck. (R.. 58) The defendants truck had been narked
in the area east of the
.t
I)aramount building. This space allo\ved for t"~o
rows of cars at slight angles off north and south facing
each other. The rear end of the north ro\Y can1e out
even \vith the north edge of the Paran1ount building.
rrhe defendants had parked in the last space on the
\vest end of the south rovv of cars and after the delivery
to Keeleys had just backed up a little to get by a
post and then proceeded north down the alley. (R. 49-50).
The plaintiff tr1ed to empha~ize the fact that the
defendants ran into his autoinobile hitting it somewhere
back of the right front fender. (R. 12). The defendants
dispute this clai::.n and state the defendants' truck was
stopped on impact (R. 50, 63, 65) and that the plaintiffs automobile ''scrubbed'' or side-s,viped the front
bumper only, (R. 49, 52, 53, 65) and that only the
1narks on the defendants' truck \Vere on the bumper.
(R. 53). The fact that the extended bumper on the
plaintiff's car was not 1narked or damaged is explainea
by the fact that the bun1per on the defendant's truck
is higher than the plaintiff's bumper. (R. 71, 72). We
feel that the plaintiff is bound by the testimony of his
ovvn witness, l\1r. I-Iale, \vho was service manager to
the Naylor Au ton1obile Co. lie ren1embered the plaintiff's automobile and the dan1age caused in the accident in question. (R. 37, 38). He testified that the
damage to the plaintiff's right front fender was all
~long the side, to the point of damaging the nickel
shield that sets over the sealed head light on the said
right front fender, and it started from the front bun1per
and went right back. (R. 38, 42, 44, 45.)
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STATEl\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I. The plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the Court that the defendants were negligent.
POINT II. The plaintiff's evidenve was insufficient
to support the court's. decision that the defendants'
negligence, if any, 'vas the proxin1ate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
POINT III. The Court erred in not finding as a .
matter of la'v and frorn the facts put in evidence that
the plaintiff vvas contributorily negligent and that the
said contributory negligence· of the plaintiff precludes
him from recovery. ·Especially due to the fact that
the defendants came into the intersection on the right
of the plainiff and had the right of way.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE
DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II.
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S DECISION THAT THE
DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

Under the theory -of the plaintiff's own case we
respectfully submit that ·these points are the highlights
of the evidence in this case :
1. That plaintiff's automobile traveling ·east arrived
at a point about halfway or about 1/3 across the intersection before he even saw the defendants' truck. Note
the 12 foot lanes and small intersection and his statement that half of his car got past the corner (R. 21.)
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2. At that point the defendants' truck "''as about
25 feet to the south do'.\~n the other alley and that except
for the fact that plainiff slan11ned on his brakes he
nevertheless continued n1oving right on past and into
the pole. ( R. 12).
3. The defendants' had barely moved the length
or less of their truck at that point and were just starting
to move from a standing position.
4. That the plaintiff was traveling at a much higher
rate of speed than the defendants. Please note the
absence of damage to the defendants' truck and the
extreme damage to the plaintiff's automobile, including
a damaged tire and heavy front end damage before
it came to a stop rrfter the collision with the defendants'
truck and skidding about five feet into the pole. (R.
13, 26).
The defendants' respectfully submit that such a
set of facts creates no ·case of negligence against the
defendants. There is no charge, or evidence of speed,
ngainst the defendants, no evidence of lack of control
or doing anything that the ordinary, prudent person
'vouldn 't do or have done in approaching an intersection
of that type. The defendant driver had to get the nose
of his car a.t least t'vo feet out in such a case to see if
any car was even coining; the plaintiff had a right
to assume that other drivers would approach such intersections at a careful rate as contemplated by law and
not at the hjgh rate of speed undoubtedly traveled
by the plaintiff. We submit that the plaintiff n1ust produce a case that is ·consistent, that must be convincing
beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden is on the
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plaintiff to pro\·l\ such n en~e. .,,,e sub1nit it is in1possible for the plaintiff to be over one-third of the way
across that intersection traveling at speeds which -vvc>rc
far in excess of that of the defendants and not be far
past the intersection by the time the defendants had
traveled the 23 feet. By the plaintiff's own testimony
he \vas into the intersection 7 or 8 feet and only had
about 11 feet to clL~ar it (R. 21). The defendants had to
go 23 feet nnd "~ere at a much lo,ve1· speed. We submit
this does not prove his case and therefore respectfully
repeat that under the evidence submitted by the plaintiff there is no proof of negligence on. the part of the
defendants and therefore the plaintiff's damage and
,injuries \\'ere not caused by any negligent acts of the
defendants.
III.
THE COURT ERRED IN NO·T FINDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND FROM THE FACTS PUT IN EVIDENCE
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AND THA-T SAID CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
OF THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDES HIM FROM RECOVERY.
ESPECIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS CAME INTO THE INTERSECTION ON THE RIGHT
OF THE PLAINTIFF AND HAD THE RIGI-IT OF WAY.

The defendants respectfully submit that regardless
of what attitude this court might take as to the presence
or lack of negligence on the part of the defendants or
vYhether this court deems it proper to even disturb that
phase of this decision, defendants maintain that the
plaintiff in this case does not come into Court with clean
hands and that he -vvas guilty of contributory negligence
'vhich we claim was the sole and proximate cause of the
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plaintiff's damage and injuries or "·a~ at lea~t a definite
and outstanding contributory cause thereto. One is
almost inclined to apologize for asking the court to
again review this perpetual problem. It has been solved
by many previous cases out of this court and as here,
new sets of facts in future cases 'viii no doubt result -in
this court being called upon to apply the rule to, and
untangle the facts of, many cases to con1e.
We come before this court, therefore, insisting that
there is negligence which can be imputed to the plaintiff
and that said negligence on the plain tiff's part was
either the sole cause of the plaintiff's losses or was a
concurring and contributory factor thereto.
After all, a collision did occur in this case. Therefore, under the circumstances involved here, where an
accident occurs in a space of about 12 feet by 12 feet,
of necessity both cars are going to have to be there at
about the same time. Defendants again, therefore, urge
that the plaintiff's version cannot be consistent when
it is clear that the plaintiff was traveling much faster
than the defendants and when plaintiff claims he was
about half to one-third through the intersection the defendants were still a car length away and yet a collision
occurred. It would have to be maintained that defendant~
\Vere traveling at a speed almost double that of plaintiff. The other facts in the record will not support such
conclusions. The defendants stopped almost, if not exactly on the point of impact. The plaintiff's car, after
that impact could not have ·been, and was not thrown
over 2 or 3 feet off course to hit the pole on the left
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front end of plaintiff's auton1obile. (See plaintiff's exhibit H..._\,''). A great impact caused by any great speed
on defendants' part vvould have netted entirely different
results. The plaintiff had no idea how fast the defendants
"'ere goin and 1nade no claim in the record of any speed
on defendants' part. (R. 20.)
Defendants, therefore, submit that the defendants
theory of this case n1uch more accurately represents
\vhat actually happened. Again, we submit that both
autmobiles entered the intersection at about the same
instant. The defendants' ·claim their truck entered first
and then stopped, but the plaintiff going faster, then
entered, brushed the defendants truck's bumper and
the collision resulted. It was certainly all confined to the
smallest in time and space so that a definite determination as to who entered the intersection first, taking
into consideration the plaintiff's greater speed, could
at best be figured only in fractions of feet and seconds,
if at all.
Defendants' charge the plaintiff with negligence
which was at least the ·contributing cause of his damage
and injuries if not the sole and proximate cause, and
that negligence being as follows :
1. For traveling at an excessive rate of speed that
\Yas not reasonable and prudent under the conditions
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing and failing to keep proper control so as to
avoid colliding with other vehicles. (Section 41-6-46,
Utah ode Annotated 1953.)
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~. For failure to yield the right of \Yay to a Yehicle
entering an intersection on the right when both vehicles
entered said intersection at the same time. (Section
·11-'6-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.)
3. For failure to be just a little more cautious than
norn1ally expected because of the lack of sight distance
and confined circumstances \vhere this accident occurred.
Speaking of contributory negligence as the proxiInate cause of losses in any accident, this honorable court
i:n the case of Hess vs. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2d at page 510
and 511, 109 Utah 60 states as follo\vs:
":B-,or plain tiff's negligence to be a defense
for the defendant, it must not only exist at the
same time and place as conditions created or the
forces put in operation by the negligence of
defendants, but it must set in operation a force,
or create a condition, which had a share in producing the injury. Proximate cause of an injury
means that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence and such as
ought to have been foreseen in the light of attending circurnstances, that is a consequ.ence which a
person of ordinary foresight and pruaence would
have anticipated.''
"It is one that directly causes or contributes
directly to causing the result. It must be such
action that a person of ordinary caution and prudence would have foreseen that some inj\lry would
likely result therefrorn. The nearest independent
cause which is adequate to and does bring about
an injury is the proximate cause thereof."
''Where an act is one which a person in the
exercise of ordinary care could have anticipated
as likely to result in injury, then he is liable for
any injury actually resulting from it, although
he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did occur. ' '
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In the ca8e of' Jlart·in vs. Stevens 1 243 Pae. ·2d. 747,
750-51, the most recent expression of this court, the question of right of way was very ably discussed. It charged
all drivers with the duty of ''due care,'' but also pointed
out that to avoid uncertainty and confusion at intersections certain rules had been laid down 'to expedite intersection traffic consistent with safety. One rules is that.
\Vhere a person clearly gets into an intersection first, he
has the right of way, and all others must respect it, then
the court proceeded to discuss the problem further as
follo\VS':
''In close cases, this test is somewhat unsatisfactory because of the 9-ifficulties, after a collision
has occurred, of determining who had the right of
way on that basis. The text just referred to cor. rectly states : '* * * * The mere fact of reaching
the intersection first is no longer recognized as
the sole test as to who has the right of way.' In
order for a driver to clai1n the right of way on
the basis of entering the intersection first, it must
appear that he did not speed up just for the pu.i.-pose of claiming the right of way, and also that
the margin of distance by which he claimed it was
so clear as to be without doubt.''
''The second rule is ·easier to apply and therefore more satisfactory, that is: When vehicles
are approaching and about to enter the intersection at substantially the same time, the driver
approaching from the right has the right of way
over the one approaching from his left. The same
text says : 'This rule has been called the basic
lavv governing operation of vehicles at street
intersections.' Necessity dictates that this rule
govern unless one vehicle is enoungh ahead of the
other in entering the intersection to assure him a
clear ·margin of safety."
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' ' even if doubt had arisen, then that is the very
circumstance in 'vhich the rule of the driver approaching fron1 the right governs. Plaintiff also
had the right of "\\ ay on that ground.''
"Although plaintiff had the right of way
under both rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon him the duty of due care in observing
for other traffic. But in doing so he had the right
to assume and to rely and act on the assumption that ~thers would do likewise ; he was not
obliged to anticipate either that other drivers
would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him
his right of way, until in the exercise of due care,
be observed, or should have observed, something
to warn him that the other driver was driving
negligently or would fail to accord him his right
of way.''
In the case of Bulloch vs. LukeJ 98 Pac. 2d. 350, 98
Utah 501, at page 352, this court dealing with another
intersection case well known to all of us, states:
''Ordinarily the driver on the right may presume that the one on the left will afford him the
right of way; and that presumption will remain
with him until such time as a reasonably prudent
person will realize that the driver on the left is
not going to afford him that right."
We submit that there is no evidence that the plaintiff slowed down to check his safety around the ParaElount Theater corner. The defendants, at least were
able to stop before going through the intersection even
though there might be some question as to how far the
defendants got past the Paramount building but it
couldn't be far. The undisputed evidence was that the
front bumper was merely scratched and then not enough
to hurt it. If the defendants had got out into the alley
7
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haYe be12n hit broaLh_.;idl• or the plaintiff \Youlcl have been
forced out of tl1e allL·y. Note that the plaintiff stayed
~- tbstantially in the alley and hit his left front corner
on the pole. These facts seem to the defendants to make
it unimportant \Yhether the defendants automobile was
pulled back or knocked back to the final position of
being even \Yith the Pararnount building if the testimony
of their witness, Hughes, and the plaintiff in that respect
is true. ( R. 35, 36, 47.) We do not doubt the possibility
of such a condition under these circumstances. No doubt
the plaintiff did look for cars as he came to this corner
but it is obvious that his caution was insufficient, untinlel:'" and of no effect under the plaintiff's speed and
conclitions then prevailing.
In Vol. II of Blashfield 's Encyclopedia of AutoHlohile Law, we find the following quotations:
~\t page 211-15, Sec. 992:
"The rule under statute or ordinance is
usually that the driver o f a vehicle approaching
an intersection from the right has the right of
way over the driver approaching from the left on
a cross street.''
''This rule has been called the basic la vv governing operation of vehicles at street intersections, and it has been said that the ingrafting;
of exceptions on to this rule is not to be favored.''
.1\.t page-> 225, Sec. 993:
"Else\vhere a statute providing that, when
t\vo vehicles approach an intersection at the san1e
time, the vehicle approaching from the right shall
haYe the right of way, has been held to apply
only where the vehicles arrive at approximately
the same time, the vvord "approach'' being connny\rhen· beyond two or three feet the narro'v alley
\rould have been blocked and either the defendants would
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strued to 1nean that the vehicles -\Yhen about to
arrive at the intersection must be approximately
a like distance away from the given point, ?r at
· least so situated that one using reasonable JUdgn1ent might anticipate their simultaneous arrival,
and an ordinance in similar terms has been construed iri a like manner.''
At page 351, Sec. 1037:
''In view of the common traffic rule according the right of vvay to a driver approaching
from the right, where such regulation prevails,
a driver is presun1ed to know that a vehicle approaching a street intersection from his right
has the right of way, and is under the duty of
looking to the right for automobiles approaching
from that direction.''
The defendants especially refrain from burdening
the court with citations outside our own jurisdiction because of the numerous Utah cases on intersection problon1s and the thoroughness with which it has been handled.
\Ve do not bother to refer to or quote from all Utah
cases. We do de sir~ to refer to the following on the
problem of due care for all drivers at intersections and
their application to the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In Bullock vs. Luke, supra, at page 352, this Honorable ·Court said :
''There is no arbitrary rule as to the time
and place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting rQad, and no particular distance from the
intersection is presecribed for that purpose. The
general standards are that observation should
be made at the first opportunity and at a point
where observation will be reasonably efficient
for, and conduce to, protection.''
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May \Ve shovv hereunder that the above requires an
observation "at the first opportunity" at a point where
it is still safe for the driver to proceed and where the
ear can still be safely controlled. The plaintiff allowed
hhnself no such opportunity. According to his ovvn testiInony \Yhile corning out 3 feet away from a blind corner,
\\-ithout even slo\ving do"\vn, he looked and saw the defendants for the first time.
In the case of Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 Pac. 2d, 514,
J17; 113 Utah 1, involving another intersection accident
this honorable court says:
'' * * * regardless of vvhich driver is technically
entitled to the right of way, both operators must
use due care and caution in proceeding into and
across inersections. While the burden to drive so
carefully as always to be prepared for, and to be
able to avoid, the negligence of another should not
be placed on either driver, there should be placed
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision.
:t'~ either should be permitted to close his eyes to
other vehicles ·w··hich he ln1ov\rs or has reason to
believe are approaching * * * ''
"Each driver is charged with using due care
to avoid the collision, and one cannot say when his
ovvn negligence continues to the point of impact,
'we "\vere both negligent, but you alone are
chargeable because I got there first and you
should have missed me' ".
\Ve do not have a Utah case known to this defendant
involving a blind corner. In fact we have ·been unable
to find a case right in point. All cases dealing with that
issue are blind curves and usually have t"\vo lanes for
traffic. The present case certainly is a blind corner case.
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Respecting such cases, Blashfield in his Encyclopedia of Automobile Law (Permanent Ed.) Vol. II at
}_)age 77, section 905, 've read as follows:
"Drivers approaching each other at a curve
or at blind corners so that they cannot see each
other are under a~ increased obligation on the
part ~f each to be on his proper side of the road,
as in such case one is legally bound to anticipate
that a vehicle from the opposite direction may
at any 1noment appear."
The law vvell supports the principle that under our
circumstances the blind corner increased the duties on
the part of both drivers. Again we submit that this increases the care the plaintiff should have exercised and
increases his contributory negligence.
The rule in all curve cases are decided on the basis
that a person must make the curve on his own side but
so as to make it safe for persons that are coming and
cannot be seen. It naturally follows that such situations
create an added burden.
A ruling symbolic of such cases is found in Pohler
vs. Hu1nbolt Motor Stages, (Calf.) 224 Pac. 2d, 440 at
page 442. The court says :
"It is true that a driver approaching a curve
is under incerased obliga.tion to be on his proper
side of the road and to reasonably anticipate that
a vehicle from the opposite direction may appear
at any moment.''
The defendants desire further to point out that
'·'·~here we are dealing with an open intersection as in
this case, where in all substantial respects there can be
no denying that both parties arrived at the intersection
at about the same time, and that the finger of blame
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pointed at either because he didn't stop, didn't look or
probably acted or failed to act in son1e other \vay, can be
pointed out in conclusion that the above is inevitably
flaYored \Yith the facts that:
1. The plaintiff \Yas traYeling at a high and excessi Ye rate of ~peed as sho\vn by the facts, while the
defendants ,,_-ere able to stop substantially at the opening
of the intersection as sho\Yll by the evidence and the
fact that the defendants stopped before damage resulted
to them.
2. That defendants had the right of \vay and plaintiff did not yield to that right of \vay.
3. This intersection \Y'as a blind one and increased
the burden en both.
The "Intersection'' is admittedly not a high,vay
intersection, but our la\v does not confine the rules to
such. We maintain Section 41-6-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, applies. Both alleys started in the rear
of certain buildings and continued on out to main high"rays or streets. Both parties hereto started on the
blind ends and were on their way out to the streets
when the accident happened so that both parties are
equal in that respect. We feel the fact that this involves
alleys in the middle of the block should not in the least
effect the application of rules generally.
CONCLUSION
The defendants submit that the facts of this case
support the defendants' contention that:
(a) The defendants were not negligent.
(b) That defendants committed no negligent acts
'vhich 'vcre the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries
and damages.
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(c) And that the plain tiff was clearly negligent and
careless and contributed to his own injuries. That said
eontributory negligence resulted from his excessive speed,
failure to keep his car under control and keep a proper
lookout, his failure to yield the right of way to the
defendants and because of the added burden resulting
from all these things happening at a blind corner and
under such close circumstances. Defendants request that
the decision of the lower court be reversed.
Respectfully sub1nitted,

C. N. OTTOSEN
1320 Continental B~nk Building
Salt Lake City, ·utah
Attorney for Defendants.
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